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We document a significant investment bank fixed effect in the announcement returns of 
an M&A deal.  The inter-quartile range of bank fixed effects is 1.26%, compared to a 
full-sample average return of 0.72%.  The results remain significant after controlling for 
the component of returns attributable to the acquirer.  Our findings suggest that 
investment banks matter for M&A outcomes, and contrast earlier studies which show no 
positive link between various measures of advisor quality and M&A returns.  Differences 
in average returns across banks are also persistent over time and predictable from prior 
performance.  Clients do not chase past returns, which may explain why persistence 
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Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are among the most critical decisions a CEO can make.  
Successful mergers can create substantial synergies, while misguided acquisitions can 
lead to misallocation of companies to parents unable to reap their full potential.  In 
addition to these large effects on shareholder value, a bad acquisition also increases the 
CEO’s risk of being fired (Lehn and Zhao (2006)).  A prominent example is the departure 
of Carly Fiorina from Hewlett Packard, which was widely attributed to her acquisition of 
Compaq.  The quality of M&A transactions is also of great importance to the economy as 
a whole.  The total value of M&A announced by a U.S. acquirer in 2007 was $2.1tr, 
around 15% of GDP. 
Since CEOs make M&A decisions rarely, they typically lack experience and seek 
counsel from investment banks.  The skilled advice hypothesis is that banks help clients 
to identify synergistic targets and negotiate favorable terms.  If banks indeed provide 
valuable advice, it is reasonable to expect that the highest-quality advisors lead to the best 
outcomes.  However, existing research generally fails to find such a relationship.  Bowers 
and Miller (1990) and Michel, Shaked and Lee (1991) measure an advisor’s quality by 
the prestige of its name and find no link with acquirer returns; Rau (2000) uses market 
share to measure quality and documents a negative relationship.  Servaes and Zenner 
(1996) find no benefit of hiring any advisor at all, compared to executing the deal in-
house.1  These findings instead appear to support the passive execution hypothesis, that 
banks do not provide true advice but are simply “execution houses” who undertake deals 
as instructed by the client.  If true, such a conclusion has troubling implications.  The 
investment banking industry, which consumes a significant proportion of an economy’s 
talented human capital, is mainly a deadweight loss to society.  CEOs’ inexperience in 
M&A is not mitigated by hiring an advisor, which may explain why so many acquisitions 
destroy value. 
This paper reaches a different conclusion.  Prior studies investigate the 
importance of investment banks for M&A outcomes by hypothesizing a measure of 
advisor quality, such as market share or name prestige, and correlating it with this 
measure of quality.  Such studies will only find significant results if their chosen 
                                                 
1 To our knowledge, only Kale, Kini and Ryan (2003) find gains to employing market-leading advisors.  
They study 324 contested takeovers of public targets, and find that large banks are more likely to withdraw 
when the price becomes too high. By contrast, both we and Rau (2000) find a negative link between market 
share and performance across all M&A transactions (over 15,000 in our sample), of which approximately 
1/3 are public.  One reason may be that the incentives to act in the client’s interest are far stronger in public 
situations, where “honest” advice to withdraw from a deal is widely observed. 
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measures are truly accurate proxies of ability.  We instead employ a fixed effects 
analysis.  This is a broader approach which examines whether banks exhibit differential 
deal returns in the first place, without having to specify a measure of advisor quality with 
which any differential will be correlated.  Indeed, we find significant bank fixed effects to 
a deal’s 3-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR). Studying all banks that advised on at 
least 10 deals over 1980-2007 and controlling for time effects, the difference between the 
25th and 75th percentile bank is 1.26%.  This difference is economically meaningful 
applied to the mean bidder size of $10 billion and compared to the mean CAR of 0.72%.  
An F-test that bank fixed effects are equal is rejected at the 1% significance level.  Our 
results support the skilled advice hypothesis and contrast prior findings that banks have 
little effect on M&A outcomes, as predicted by the passive execution hypothesis. 
Returns analyses have also been used to evaluate skill in mutual funds, hedge 
funds and security analysts.  Our setting shares two challenges also faced by studies of 
stock-picking ability.  The first is performance attribution: returns are not purely the 
responsibility of the financial intermediary.  In an investment setting, returns also depend 
on the portfolio’s factor loadings and realized factor outcomes.  Since investment skill 
depends on how a portfolio performs over the long run, investment studies typically 
investigate long-horizon returns.  Therefore, the results are highly contingent on the 
benchmark asset pricing model used (Fama (1998)).  Benchmark adjustment is less of an 
issue here, since performance can be measured by short-horizon announcement returns: 
in an efficient market, they capture the full value impact of an acquisition.  Our setting 
faces a different performance attribution challenge – CAR may be the responsibility of 
either the bank or the client.  A bank may be associated with positive (negative) CARs if 
it is systematically mandated by high-quality (empire-building) clients.  Many prior 
studies (e.g. Bowers and Miller (1990), Michel, Shaked and Lee (1991), Rau (2000), 
Hunter and Jagtiani (2003)) do not tackle performance attribution and assume CAR 
results entirely from the bank.  Others control for deal characteristics (e.g. Servaes and 
Zenner (1996), Kale, Kini and Ryan (2003)), but acknowledge that this solution may go 
too far the other way, since deal characteristics are often the advisor’s responsibility.2  
We control for the component of CAR that can be explained by acquirer characteristics 
                                                 
2 For example, Servaes and Zenner (1996) caveat their conclusion by acknowledging “it is not certain that 
the [deal characteristics] affecting investment banking choice are exogenous. For example, it is possible 
that investment banks influence the form of payment or the decision to pursue the acquisition.” 
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that proxy for the likelihood that the client is empire-building (such as free cash flow and 
various governance measures, as used by Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007)) and high-
quality (such as stock and operating performance, and Tobin’s Q).  We also add acquirer 
fixed effects to proxy for time-invariant unobservable measures of quality.  Even after 
these controls, the bank fixed effects remain statistically and economically significant, 
with an inter-quartile range of 1.23%. 
A second shared challenge is that average returns depend not only on ability, but 
also scale.  Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) argue that conglomerate firms’ lower 
productivity arises since they are able to accept all projects with positive NPV (including 
those with modestly-positive NPV), whereas single-segment firms with financing 
constraints can only pursue those with high NPV.  Applied to our setting, this limited 
capacity hypothesis posits that banks differ not in ability, but capacity to accept 
mandates.  Small banks can work only on the highest-return deals; large banks also 
accept mandates with small (but positive) value and thus exhibit lower average returns.  
We refute this hypothesis by showing that the banks with the lowest average returns are 
not the most frequent advisors – the correlation between bank fixed effects and market 
share is an insignificant 0.03 (p-value of 0.72).  Indeed, the most frequent advisors 
occupy the middle of the fixed effects distribution.   
While addressing the limited capacity hypothesis, that the most positive and most 
negative fixed effects are associated with infrequent advisors may give rise to two quite 
different concerns.  First, these extreme fixed effects may result from measurement error 
arising from few observations, rather than a “true” dispersion of advisor quality.  Second, 
it may be that there is little dispersion among the major banks who matter more for the 
M&A market – i.e. the result is not generalizable to the most important advisors.  Note 
that infrequent advisors will not drive the statistical significance of our results: if many 
banks have imprecisely measured fixed-effects, the F-test will have little power.  To 
address concerns that they drive our economic magnitudes, the inter-quartile range 
reported earlier is based on fixed effects weighted by the inverse of their standard errors.  
Moreover, to further investigate whether our results hold among frequent advisors alone, 
we then test the equality of bank fixed effects on a sub-sample of the largest banks who 
advise on at least 84 deals over the 28-year sample period (i.e. 3 per year).  Even though 
the number of banks falls markedly from 143 to 42, the results stay significant with an 
inter-quartile range of 0.74% (controlling for acquirer characteristics and acquirer fixed 
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effects) and the F-test of equality is rejected at the 1% level.  Thus, there are meaningful 
differences even among the most active advisors.   
Having documented that banks are associated with different CARs over the entire 
period, we then ask whether these differences are predictable based on historic data, and 
thus can be used by clients to guide their selection of advisors.  The fixed effect implies a 
persistent component to a bank’s CAR and thus provides us with a priori motivation to 
predict future returns using past returns, rather than the market share and prestige 
measures previously studied. Indeed, we find that performance is persistent:  the top 
quintile of banks based on CAR over the past 2 years outperforms the bottom quintile by 
0.94% over the next 2 years (significant at 1%).  Persistence remains after removing the 
component of CAR that can be attributed to client characteristics.  Inconsistent with the 
limited capacity hypothesis, the low CARs of the bottom-quintile banks do not arise from 
executing mildly positive transactions, but from executing double the proportion of 
value-destructive deals as the top quintile.  Regression analyses yield similar results: a 
bank’s average returns are significantly linked to its past average returns, even when 
controlling for market share.  When interacting past returns with market share, the 
interaction term is insignificant but past returns alone remain significant, suggesting that 
effect of past returns is similar for both frequent and infrequent advisors.   
The existence of persistence in M&A advice contrasts the lack of persistence in 
mutual funds.  Berk and Green (2004) show that, even if mutual funds possess skill, this 
does not translate into persistence if investor flows respond to past performance and there 
are diminishing returns to scale.  We find that a bank’s market share is independent of its 
past CAR (also found by Rau (2000)). This lack of performance-chasing can potentially 
reconcile why persistence exists in M&A advice but not mutual funds (e.g. Carhart 
(1997)).  Instead, we find that mandate awards are highly correlated with past market 
share, even though market share negatively predicts future performance.  
The selection of high-market share rather than high-CAR advisors has two quite 
different interpretations.  First, it may be efficient, if clients build up relationship-specific 
capital with particular banks and thus rationally retain the same advisor irrespective of 
past performance; market share has predictive power as it measures a bank’s existing 
relationships.  We show that retaining a past advisor is associated with worse future 
performance, particularly if the bank advised on negative-CAR transactions in the past, 
which does not support the view that relationship-specific capital improves future M&A 
 6
performance.  However, clients may derive other services from banking relationships, 
such as lending and underwriting, which rationally induces them to retain their existing 
bank (see Yasuda (2005), Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2006, 2009)).  
Alternatively, it may be inefficient if clients are not locked into relationships but 
voluntarily choose advisors based on market share, under the misperception that it 
predicts superior returns.  Such behavior is consistent with real-life practices: market 
share league tables are widely publicized by both the media and the banks themselves, 
and so both academics and practitioners have come to use them as a measure of expertise.   
Ertugurul and Krishnan (2010) also study the existence of ability in investment 
banking.  They focus on individual bankers who switch advisors, rather than banks 
themselves.3  Another difference is that, in addition to identifying a fixed effect in the full 
sample, we also investigate persistence and thus the predictability of future outcomes 
using past performance.  Jaffe, Pedersen and Voetmann (2009) demonstrate persistence 
in M&A performance at the client level.  Mikhail, Walther and Willis (2004) and Hoberg 
(2007) document persistence in two other banking services, security analysis and equity 
underwriting.  
This paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 discusses the potential sources of 
differential M&A returns across banks and Section 2 describes the data.  Section 3 
documents significant advisor fixed effects to M&A returns and shows that average 
returns are predictable using past performance.  Section 4 shows that mandate awards are 
correlated not with past performance but with market share, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
1. Motivation: Why Might Banks Be Associated With Differential M&A Returns? 
This section discusses a theoretical framework for why there may be a bank fixed 
effect to M&A returns, i.e. why certain banks may be systematically associated with high 
or low return deals.  To understand the possible sources of correlation, we first outline the 
role that advisors play in M&A deals.  Their actual level of involvement can vary 
significantly across transactions, and falls under three broad categories.  
                                                 
3 We study banks rather than individual bankers for two reasons. First, a transaction typically leverages 
resources across the entire bank (e.g. a debt-financed acquisition of a German chemicals target by a UK 
pharmaceuticals firm may involve the M&A and debt  product groups and the pharmaceuticals, chemicals, 
UK and Germany coverage teams).  Second, it is difficult to know which particular banker worked on a 
certain deal.  A bank’s chemicals team consists of several bankers, many of whom will not be involved in 
the deal.  If a bank’s skill hinges on particular star bankers (who often move between firms) rather than the 
whole organization, we should find weak bank fixed effects and bank-level persistence. 
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In a “bank-initiated deal,” the advisor is involved in both selecting the deal and 
negotiating terms, and thus is responsible for the entire CAR.  In a “standard client-
initiated deal,” the client proposes the transaction, but lacks the ability to identify good 
deals and so relies on the bank to advise whether to pursue it.  Since the bank can reject a 
bad deal, it is again responsible for deal selection in addition to negotiation, and thus the 
entire CAR.  Not all banks will reject the deal, but for reasons which are their 
responsibility.  Some lack the ability to identify bad deals; others know that a deal will 
destroy value but undertake it to maximize their own fee income rather than pursuing the 
client’s interests.  A bank cannot blame low CARs on having to work on bad deals, since 
it controls its deal flow – just as a lender cannot blame losses on poor credit quality, since 
it controls the loans it chooses to write. 
In a “fixated client deal,” the acquirer has already decided on the target and does 
not seek advice on its appropriateness; it uses the bank simply to execute the transaction 
on the best terms possible. This may occur in two cases.  First, the client may be skilled 
in identifying targets and does not need the bank’s input.  At the other extreme, the client 
is empire-building or hubristic and wishes to pursue a bad deal even if the bank cautions 
otherwise.  By accepting the mandate, the bank may be adding value compared to the 
counterfactual of the client pursuing the acquisition with a rival advisor.  The bank is not 
responsible for the component of CAR that can be attributed to the acquirer’s skill or 
hubris, only the orthogonal component.   
Given banks’ varying levels of involvement, systematic differences in average 
returns may stem from three sources.  The skilled advice hypothesis is that certain 
advisors possess ability, either in proposing targets (for bank-initiated deals) or in 
negotiating terms (for all deals).  Alternatively, variation may stem from systematically 
turning away bad deals.  This requires ability to identify such deals, plus trustworthiness 
to turn them down.  We use the term “skilled advice” to include these three qualities of 
deal identification, transaction negotiation and trustworthiness.  Thus, even a bank with 
high-quality employees may be classified as low-ability if its business model is to accept 
every mandate, regardless of whether it will create client value. 
The passive execution hypothesis is that banks lack ability in target selection or 
deal negotiation.  Instead, variation in returns arises because the bank is systematically 
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mandated by skilled (empire-building) clients.4  In reality, banks exert substantial effort 
in pitching deals to clients: they allocate the majority of bankers to client coverage (rather 
than deal execution) groups which are primarily responsible for pitching.  Therefore, it 
seems unlikely that fixated client deals are sufficiently prevalent to explain differences in 
average returns.  However, since it is impossible to observe which party initiates a 
transaction and provide direct statistics on this prevalence, to be conservative we also 
report results controlling for the component of returns attributable to acquirer 
characteristics.  The passive execution hypothesis would also be supported if bank fixed 
effects are not significant in the first place.  
The limited capacity hypothesis posits that banks differ not in ability, but their 
capacity to accept mandates.  A bank may exhibit a high average CAR because it can 
work on only the highest value-creating deals, whereas low CAR may arise if a bank has 
the capacity to execute also mildly good deals.  We evaluate this hypothesis by 
investigating whether a bank’s low average CAR stems from advising on deals with 
modest value, or value-destructive deals. 5  
 
2. Performance Metrics, Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We use Thomson Financial’s Securities Data Company (SDC) data for mergers 
announced between January 1980 and December 2007.  Since deals that involve a change 
of control are most likely to affect acquirer returns, we retain only transactions 
categorized as “Merger”, “Acquisition”, “Acquisition of Assets” or “Acquisition of 
Majority Interest” and drop all deals for which the acquirer’s initial stake exceeded 50%, 
or its final stake was below 50%.  We also drop transactions for which the acquirer had 
no stock returns on CRSP or the deal value was below $1m (as in Rau (2000)).  Our final 
sample contains 15,344 deals.   
Our value-creation measure is the acquirer’s (-1, +1) CAR over the CRSP value-
weighted index, which we winsorize at 1% and 99%.6  Stock returns are the relevant 
                                                 
4 Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005) construct an assignment model where high-quality banks are 
systematically mandated by high-quality clients. 
5 The limited capacity hypothesis is less likely for investment banks than corporations or mutual funds.  
Even small banks are able to work on very large transactions - for example, the boutique Gleacher employs 
50 staff and advised on Bank of Scotland’s $40b merger with Halifax, AT&T’s $22b sale to SBC 
Communications and MFS Communications’ $14b merger with WorldCom.   
6 We also obtain beta model returns from Eventus and find similar results.  The correlation between beta 
model returns and returns above the CRSP value-weighted (VW) index is 98.5%.  Since the beta model 
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performance measure as they represent the change in shareholder wealth, capitalizing all 
of the future effects of an acquisition; they are thus used in the vast majority of 
investment banking studies (see, e.g., Bowers and Miller (1990), Servaes and Zenner 
(1996), Rau (2000)).  While CAR refers to one specific deal, RET is the average CAR to 
all deals advised by a bank in a j-year period.  To be included in the analysis, a bank must 
have announced at least 2j deals within the period.7   
Some papers attribute the entire CAR to the bank, which constitutes an over-
attribution in fixated client deals.  Others remove the component explained by deal 
characteristics but this leads to an under-attribution, since deal characteristics may be 
chosen by the advisor, either directly by initiating the deal or indirectly by accepting a 
client-proposed mandate.  We control for acquirer characteristics that proxy for client 
quality or empire-building since they are outside a bank’s control, taking its client base as 
given. Note that banks may have some control over their client base: if a bank advises a 
standard client to abandon a bad deal, it does not enter its client base. Therefore, 
controlling for acquirer characteristics is conservative.  
A number of our characteristics are related to governance.  Masulis, Wang and 
Xie (2007) find that governance mechanisms are significantly related to acquirer returns.  
Their primary measure is the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index.  Unfortunately, it 
is not suitable here since it is only available from 1990 and we require a long time series 
to test for persistence; moreover, it is only available for a subset of firms in a given year.  
We therefore include other governance mechanisms studied by Masulis et al.: 
institutional ownership, leverage, and product market competition (measured by the 
Herfindahl index and the industry’s median ratio of selling expense to sales).  The second 
group of characteristics are proxies for acquirer quality, also from Masulis et al: Tobin’s 
Q, stock price run-up, and operating performance.  We also use the other bidder 
characteristics studied by Masulis et al.: free cash flow (which may facilitate empire-
building) and size (which Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) show is negatively 
correlated with returns).  Since omitted acquirer characteristics may over-attribute CAR 
to the bank, we add additional controls over and above those featured in prior literature.  
                                                                                                                                                 
cannot be calculated for several acquirers, we use returns above the CRSP VW index.  In addition, 
Hackbarth and Morellec (2007) show that betas change substantially upon a merger, and so a beta 
calculated based on historical data is likely to be misleading.  We use the CRSP VW index as a benchmark 
as Rau and Vermaelen (1998) document biases when using size and book-to-market adjusted CARs. 
7 Where a deal has multiple advisors, the deal is credited to each advisor separately.  This is consistent with 
how SDC constructs market share league tables. 
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We include inside ownership from Compact Disclosure, to measure management’s 
alignment with shareholders. Where missing, we impute it using firm sales and age.8  To 
proxy for empire-building intent, we include the number of acquirer SIC codes and a 
dummy for whether it made an acquisition in the previous five years.  Finally, we include 
dummies for the bidder’s Fama-French industry.9  Full variable definitions are given in 
Table 1.  All variables are calculated for the fiscal year ending the year before deal 
announcement.10 
We use CARRES to denote the residual CAR after controlling for acquirer 
characteristics, and define RETRES as the average CARRES over a j-year period.  The 
regression results are shown in Table 2.  Most coefficients are of the expected sign: 
returns are increasing in leverage, operating performance and inside ownership, and 
decreasing in free cash flow and the number of SIC codes.  The R2 of 4% is 
commensurate with Masulis et al.’s R2 of 5%.  Their R2 is marginally higher as they 
include deal characteristics, which are not appropriate here since they are under the 
bank’s control. 
Since the bank is responsible for raw CAR in all but fixated client deals, it 
constitutes our core measure.  As with any investment decision, an M&A transaction 
should be undertaken if the NPV, irrespective of project characteristics, exceeds zero.  A 
bank cannot justify a negative-NPV transaction by arguing that other clients with (say) 
the same number of SIC codes undertook even worse deals, if it had the option to turn 
away the deal in the first place. 
 
3. Return Differences Across Investment Banks 
3.1. Full-Sample Fixed Effects 
                                                 
8 Specifically, we winsorize sales at 1% and 99% and regress inside ownership on sales and age.  We then 
use the coefficients to predict inside ownership for the firms where it is missing. The R2 of the first-stage 
regression is 13%. 
9 We use acquirer industry fixed effects rather than running the analysis for each industry separately (i.e. 
studying the fixed effect of a particular bank-industry group) because very few banks undertake at least 2j 
transactions within a given industry in j years, the minimum required to calculate an accurate RET measure. 
10 Our regression of CAR on characteristics is run on the entire sample with year-fixed effects.  Using a 
rolling window would cause data from the early period of the sample to be dropped and would also produce 
less precise estimates.  Full-sample regressions are thus often used in asset pricing.  We are not assuming 
that clients use past data to estimate the characteristics parameters for themselves when choosing banks.  
Instead, we posit that clients already have in mind a model of the effect of acquirer characteristics on 
returns, which they use to isolate the portion of CAR that is outside the bank’s control.  As 
econometricians, we are attempting to estimate this model, for which we require the full sample.   
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Most prior research on advisor ability attributes a deal’s CAR entirely to the bank 
and studies the association between average CAR and a variable hypothesized to proxy 
for bank quality, such as market share or reputation (measured by the prestige of the 
bank’s name).  Such analyses will only find significant results if ability is correlated with 
their chosen measures of advisor quality.  Thus, the absence of a link with market share 
or reputation need not imply that banks do not matter for M&A outcomes.  
We therefore take a broader approach.  Rather than hypothesizing a measure of 
bank ability, we investigate whether banks exhibit differential CARs in the first place by 
estimating the bank fixed effect component of a deal’s returns.  We regress CAR on bank 
fixed effects while controlling for time fixed effects, since market enthusiasm for M&A 
may have varied over time.  We then add acquirer characteristics to proxy for observable 
measures of quality or empire-building.  Finally, we add acquirer fixed effects, to proxy 
for time-invariant unobservable measures of advisor quality.  If two banks merge (e.g. 
Deutsche Bank buys Bankers Trust), we construct one fixed effect for the target (Bankers 
Trust) and a separate fixed effect for the acquirer (Deutsche Bank) both before and after 
the merger.   
The results are shown in Table 3, for the 143 banks that advised on at least 10 
deals over 1980-2007 or were acquired by a bank that advised on at least 10 deals.  Panel 
A finds that, in all specifications, the fixed effects are highly significantly different from 
each other (p-values < 0.01).  Panel B demonstrates economic significance of these 
differences.  The difference between the 25th and 75th percentile banks is 0.9-1.3%11, 
compared with the average CAR of 0.72% and the mean bidder size of $10 billion.  To 
our knowledge, these results constitute the first large-scale evidence that certain banks 
are systematically associated with superior M&A returns, and contradict prior findings 
that advisor quality has no positive effect on M&A outcomes. 
While supportive of the skilled advice hypothesis, differential returns could also 
be consistent with the limited capacity hypothesis, if the banks with the highest fixed 
effects advise on the fewest transactions.  To investigate this, Figure 1 presents a scatter 
plot of a bank’s fixed effect against its market share (by number of deals).  Inconsistent 
with the limited capacity hypothesis, the most frequent advisors occupy the middle, rather 
than the lower end of the distribution.  There is a hump-shaped relationship between 
                                                 
11 Following Bertrand and Schoar (2003) we weight each fixed effect by the inverse of its standard error to 
account for estimation error.  Without this weighting, the inter-quartile range of fixed effects is 1.7-2.2%. 
 12
market share and fixed effects, and the correlation between the two variables is an 
insignificant -0.05 to 0.05. 
While Figure 1 provides evidence against the limited capacity hypothesis, it may 
raise a different concern – perhaps the significant results of Table 3 are driven by 
infrequent advisors whose fixed effects are noisily measured, or who are relatively 
unimportant for the M&A market as a whole.  To address this concern, the inter-quartile 
ranges of fixed effects that we reported above are after weighting each fixed effect by the 
inverse of its standard error.  Moreover, we further investigate this hypothesis by testing 
for equality of fixed effects focusing only on the largest banks who advised on at least 84 
transactions over the sample period, i.e. 3 per year.  42 banks meet this criterion.  Panel C  
shows that the fixed effects remain jointly statistically significant at the 1% level, and the 
inter-quartile range is an economically meaningful 0.74%, even when continuing to 
control for acquirer characteristics and acquirer fixed effects.   
Another measurement concern is that, while CAR measures the full value impact 
of a deal in an efficient market, it may understate it if part is incorporated into prices 
before or after announcement.  The former will occur if the deal leaks out early, bringing 
the measured returns of both good and bad deals towards zero.  The latter will occur if 
investors do not notice certain effects of the transaction until later and this failure is not 
unbiased (i.e. they fail to notice more good than bad effects, or vice-versa).  While long-
run returns would capture a greater proportion of the transaction’s impact, they would 
also incorporate many other corporate events (e.g. dividend and earnings changes not due 
to the acquisition) and hence suffer from a high noise-to-signal ratio.  Moreover, errors 
resulting from failure to use the “true” benchmark model of stock returns are 
compounded over long horizons (Fama (1998)).   
In the classical “errors-in-variables” problem, where measurement error is 
symmetric (i.e. the average error is zero) and similar across observations, 
mismeasurement simply attenuates the results.  Our setting differs from the standard 
problem in two ways.  First, mismeasurement arising from leakage or delayed reaction is 
asymmetric: positive (negative) true returns are associated with negative (positive) errors.  
If the mean return were zero, positive and negative true returns would be equally likely 
and so the average error would also be zero – thus, the results would again be attenuated.  
By contrast, our mean CAR is positive and so the average error is negative, biasing 
reported returns towards zero and thus below the mean.  This would not be a problem if 
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mismeasurement was similar across banks, since it would reduce measured RET evenly 
across the sample.  However, our second difference is that mismeasurement may be more 
serious for certain banks.  For example, small banks may advise small clients, whose 
deals are less closely followed by M&A arbitrageurs or the media, leading to less leakage 
and thus higher measured CAR.  Thus, a low RET fixed effect may result from 
measurement error rather than underperformance.12  We address the mismeasurement 
explanation in a number of ways.  First, it is reasonable to assume that transactions with 
measured CARs exceeding 10% in absolute value did not suffer from attenuation.  The 
remaining 87% of deals is the subset for which attenuation may be present.  The mean 
CAR for this subset is -0.016%, very close to zero.  Hence, any attenuation is indeed 
towards the mean as in the classic errors-in-variables setting, and leads to our results 
being understated.13  Second, in  Panels D and E we filter out low-price and low-volume 
acquirers, and show that the results are barely affected.14  For example, the inter-quartile 
range is 0.8%, even when focusing on the 42 largest banks and adding all controls.  
Third, we later show (in Panel D of Table 5) that the low average returns of low-RET 
banks stem from them undertaking a high proportion of value-destructive deals, rather 
than deals with small but positive measured value.15   
To demonstrate the results on an individual bank level, Table 4 provides summary 
statistics on the 15 largest banks by number of deals.  There is significant variation in the 
average returns to each bank, which range from -0.12% (UBS) to 1.47% (Bank of 
America).  Controlling for acquirer characteristics sometimes has a marked impact on 
                                                 
12 For example, assume banks A and B both execute deals with true value creation of 1.5%, 1.0% and -
1.0% (i.e. a positive mean).  Bank A’s CARs fully capture the value, and so its RET is 0.5%.  Bank B’s 
CARs capture only half of the value due to leakage or underreaction, and so its CARs will be 0.75%, 0.5% 
and -0.5%, yielding a RET of 0.25%.  
13 Continuing the earlier example, assume banks A and B both execute deals with true value creation of 
12%, 1% and -1%.  Bank A’s CARs fully capture the value and Bank B’s CARs for the final two deals are 
halved.  Since the deals that exhibit attenuation have a zero average return, both banks will have the same 
RET.  
14 Specifically, we keep only cases where the acquirer’s price is at least $1 before the acquisition and where 
there is trading volume either 2 or 3 days before the announcement and trading volume on the day after the 
announcement.  These filters are similar in spirit to Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) who use an initial $1 
and zero volume screen.  Our setting differs from the anomalies literature (e.g. Diether et al.) in that we 
only require that CAR be a signal of value creation and do not require that it be tradable; thus, the M&A 
literature does not typically employ such filters.  Further, CRSP reports the midpoint of bid and ask if a 
closing price is not available. 
15 A further hypothesis is that banks differ not in skill, but the fees that they charge: low RET banks may be 
adding the same value as their rivals, but charging higher fees.  We are unable to calculate “pre-fee” CARs 
as fees are only available for 2,046 deals within our sample. However, among the deals that do have fee 
data, we find that the correlation between acquirer returns and fees (scaled by market cap) is a slightly 
positive 0.013, inconsistent with the hypothesis that low RET results from high fees. 
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banks’ performance measures: for example, Goldman Sachs has the second lowest fixed 
effect (-0.93%) when only controlling for year dummies, but it rises to an above-average 
0.17% when adding acquirer characteristics and acquirer fixed effects. 
 
3.2. Persistence in Announcement Returns 
While significant bank fixed effects suggest that advisors matter for M&A 
returns, the results of Table 3 are not actionable by clients in their selection decisions, 
since they are based on the full 28-year sample.  We therefore analyze whether clients 
can predict positive future returns based on historic data.  The existence of a bank fixed 
effect implies a persistent component to a bank’s average CAR and thus provides a priori 
motivation for predicting future returns using an advisor’s past returns, rather than the 
market share and reputation measures previously studied.  This a priori motivation 
mitigates potential concerns of data-mining for advisor characteristics with predictive 
power. We calculate persistence in advisor performance in a similar manner to Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) for stocks and Carhart (1997) for mutual funds.  At the start of each 
year, we sort banks into quintiles based on RET for the past j calendar years, where j = 
{1,2,3}.  Next, for each quintile, we calculate RET for all banks within the quintile over 
the next k calendar years, where k = {1,2,3}.  We report the difference in RET between 
the top (Q5) and bottom (Q1) quintiles.16,17  
Table 5 illustrates the results.  Panel A documents significant persistence in raw 
CAR in 8 out of the 9 time horizons.  For example, when j=k=2, the difference between 
Q1 and Q5 is 0.94%, significant at the 1% level.  This result need not imply differential 
ability, if fixated client deals comprise a substantial proportion of all transactions, and so 
we next control for acquirer characteristics.18  Panel B illustrates persistence in the 
component attributable to advisors (RETRES).  Thus, the persistence in RET does not 
                                                 
16As future returns are overlapping, we correct for mechanical autocovariance by using Newey-West 
standard errors for panel data. 
17 To illustrate our treatment of bank mergers, we continue with the example of the Deutsche Bank (DB) 
and Bankers Trust (BT) merger in June 1999.   Consider a regression of 2-year RET on past 2-year RET.  
For any observations where RET ends in 1998 or earlier, DB and BT enter separately and both RET and 
RET are calculated on a standalone basis.  For any observations where RET ends in 1999 or later, we drop 
the two standalone observations and create one combined observation.  Specifically, RET for 1998-1999 
includes all deals advised by either DB, BT or the merged entity during this period.  To be consistent, the 
past RET measure will also include all deals advised by either bank or the merged entity in 1996-1997. 
18 Since the persistence analysis uses short windows of 1-3 years, we do not include acquirer fixed effects, 
because identifying purely on repeat acquirers who switch advisors would mean that very few deals are 
used to calculate RETRES and lead to substantial noise. 
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arise because banks are systematically mandated by fixated acquirers, consistent with the 
skilled advice hypothesis.   
The above panels calculate RET and RETRES using an equally-weighted average 
of a bank’s CARs.  Equal-weighting is appropriate if one believes that each transaction is 
a separate measure of the bank’s ability and thus should be considered equally; it is also 
consistent with the main analysis on bank fixed effects which treats each deal equally.  
Indeed, Mikhail, Walther and Willis (2004) and Hoberg (2007), who study performance 
persistence in two other investment banking services (analyst recommendations and 
equity underwriting) also use equal-weighting.  However, weighting CARs by the size of 
the transaction may be appropriate if one believes that banks put greater effort into larger 
deals and so they are a more accurate measure of ability, or larger deals are more 
complex and thus a truer test of advisor quality.  Panel C repeats the analysis under size-
weighting.  The results for our core performance measure, RET, are now stronger in 
terms of economic significance in 8 of the 9 cells, and are at least 10% significant in six.  
The results for RETRES remain positive in all cells but are significant in only two. 
While suggestive of persistence, the above results admit other interpretations.  A 
notable feature of Panel A is that the average returns are positive even for Q1.  Thus, it is 
consistent with both the limited capacity and mismeasurement hypotheses: Q1’s low RET 
arises not due to bad deals, but deals with modest measured returns – either because they 
actually generate small value, or they actually generate large value which is under-
measured.  We address both interpretations by calculating the “success ratio” of each 
bank: the percentage of deals which have a positive CAR.  The correlation between one-
year RET and bank success ratio is 0.68.  Panel D illustrates that Q5 has approximately 
double the success ratio of Q1, 65-72% compared to 27-38%.  Therefore, inconsistent 
with these hypotheses, Q1’s low RET stems from a high proportion of value-destructive 
deals, rather than deals with small but positive measured returns.  Additional suggestive 
evidence against the limited capacity hypothesis is in Figure 1, which shows no 
correlation between a bank’s RET and its market share.   
While Table 5 is a bank-level analysis, which considers each bank equally, 
another approach is a deal-level analysis.  The Online Appendix shows that the results 
remain robust – deals where the advisor was in the top quintile based on 2-year prior 
performance outperform the bottom quintile by 0.91%, significant at the 1% level.  This 
persistence continues to hold after controlling for acquirer characteristics.  The Online 
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Appendix also considers other performance measures than CAR.  It documents 
persistence in a bank’s completion ratio and speed of completion, and show that these are 
weakly positively correlated with RET. 
As in Section 3.1, we also subdivide the analysis into the largest and smallest 
banks.  Note that such a division significantly reduces power by lowering our sample 
size.  Other persistence analyses in corporate finance typically study accounting variables 
(e.g. Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008)) which are 
directly under the manager’s control.   Moreover, many accounting variables are naturally 
persistent: for example, Lemmon et al. study the level of leverage, which is naturally 
persistent as any changes to leverage are with respect to last period’s leverage as a 
starting point.  Thus, far fewer observations are needed to achieve power.  By contrast, 
M&A returns start from a “clean slate” each time – the starting point is zero, rather than 
the return of the last M&A deal.  Moreover, M&A returns are notoriously noisy because 
they reflect the market’s reaction rather than a variable controlled by management; 
indeed, previous studies of M&A returns (e.g. Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007)) find low 
R-squareds, implying they are difficult to explain.  Thus, stratifying the sample will 
markedly reduce the statistical power of our tests, as well as lowering the cross-sectional 
variation within each subsample.  Nevertheless, we perform such a stratification to 
investigate the source of the significant results in Table 5.  We define “large banks” as 
those in the top 2/3 by number of deals in the period over which past performance is 
measured, and “small banks” as those in the lowest third.  We divide banks into terciles 
of past performance in the large bank subsample and halves within the small bank 
subsample, rather than quintiles, to obtain approximately the same number of banks in 
each quantile as before (since 2/3 * 5 is close to 3 and 1/3 * 5 is close to 2).  While the 
number of banks remains similar within each quantile, moving from quintiles to terciles 
or halves reduces the variation between the top and bottom quantile.   
The left side of Panel E of Table 5 gives the RET results for large banks.  7 of the 
9 cells are significant which suggests that persistence does exist among the large bank 
subsample alone.  The results are slightly weaker than in Table 5, consistent with reduced 
power.  The right side of Panel E demonstrates the findings for small banks.  The results 
remain significant in 7 of the 9 cells even though the sample size has fallen by 2/3.  One 
of the motivations for removing small banks is that their RET may be measured with 
significant error given the small number of deals.  Thus, the variations in bank fixed 
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effects in Table 3 may reflect noise rather than true differences in performance.  
However, while noise may explain cross-sectional variation at a given point in time, it is 
unlikely to account for time series persistence – noise implies that returns might be 
measured to be very high in one period, and then very low in an adjacent period.  By 
contrast, we find evidence of persistence for even infrequent advisors, suggesting their 
return differences reflect true variation in performance rather than noise. 
 
3.3. Regression Analysis 
The analysis of Section 3.2 studies differences in average performance between 
the top and bottom quantiles.  To ensure that the results are not purely driven by banks at 
the extremes (i.e. the best and worst banks alone), we conduct a similar analysis using 
regressions.  In addition to using all banks in the sample, regressions also allow us to 
control for other potential predictors of past returns.  In particular, Rau (2000) finds that 
RET is negatively related to a bank’s past market share; he does not examine the effect of 
past returns.  We wish to examine whether the explanatory power of past RET remains 
when controlling for market share.  We run the following pooled regression: 
 
RETt,t = αt + βRRETt-j,t-1 +  βSSHARE t-j,t-1. (1) 
 
SHAREt-j,t-1 is the market share over the past j calendar years, by dollar value of 
deals (using number of deals leads to similar results).  Since we have shown that bank 
fixed effects are significant, and our regressors may not capture the full fixed effects, the 
residuals for deals advised by the same bank might be correlated.  We therefore cluster 
standard errors by bank.  The results are illustrated in Panel A of Table 6.  The 
regressions replicate the positive association between future RET and past RET 
documented in the quintile analysis, for all values of j.  Market share is significantly 
negatively related to future returns in all three specifications in which it is included.  The 
Online Appendix shows similar results in a deal-level analysis.   
We are again interested whether our results apply to the M&A advisory market in 
general, or instead are driven by small acquirers. Panel B adds an interaction term 
between RET and SHARE.  The interaction term is insignificant (t-statistics all below 
0.5), suggesting that persistence is not weaker for larger banks.  Moreover, the 
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coefficients on RET and SHARE alone retain their significant coefficients in all 
specifications.  While stratifying the quintile analysis of Section 3.2 significantly reduces 
sample size, a regression analysis allows us to use an interaction term to study how the 
results vary across banks of different sizes without such a reduction.  In addition, while 
the coefficient on RET gives the significance of the marginal effect if SHARE = 0, we 
also include the coefficient if SHARE = 5%, i.e. for a frequent advisor with a 5% market 
share.  From Table 4, a bank with a 5% market share would be in the top 10 advisors.  
The table demonstrates that the marginal effect of past RET remains significant even for 
frequent advisors.  
Another interesting question is whether ability differences have decreased over 
time.  Morrison and Wilhelm (2007, 2008) show that investment banking skills have 
become commoditized over time, in part due to rapid increases in computer power and 
the rise in general skills resulting from MBA degrees.  If true, and if our results are 
primarily driven by the early part of our sample, our findings become less interesting 
because we are documenting a phenomenon that is no longer in existence.  We 
investigate this hypothesis in Panel C of Table 6 by adding an additional regressor, 
RET*FIRSTHALF, where FIRSTHALF is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
dependent variable is in  the first half of our performance sample, 1981-1994.   This is an 
appropriate cut-off as Morrison and Wilhelm (2008, Figure 3) document a marked 
increase in computer power around 1993-4.  The interaction term is positive but 
insignificant in all six specifications.  In the presence of the interaction term, the 
coefficient on RET now measures persistence using the second half of the dataset only.  
Importantly, even though we have less power, past RET remains significant in all 
specifications for j≥2, suggesting that the ability differences we document remain 
significant today.   
 
4. Do Clients Chase Performance? 
Even if a financial intermediary possesses superior ability (our fixed effects 
results of Table 3), Berk and Green (2004) show that this need not translate into 
performance persistence (our quintile and regression results of Tables 5-6) if two 
necessary conditions hold: clients chase past returns and there are diminishing returns to 
scale.  Indeed, our persistence results for M&A advice contrast the lack of persistence in 
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mutual funds (see, e.g., Carhart (1997).)  Since past RET positively predicts future RET, it 
would seem logical for clients to select banks based on past performance, in which case 
persistence will disappear if there are diminishing returns to scale.  For ability to translate 
into persistence, it is sufficient for one of the necessary conditions in Berk and Green to 
be violated.  We investigate whether clients respond to past performance (the first 
condition) as it is much cleaner to measure than returns to scale. 
Table 7 studies the effect of past performance on a bank’s future market share.  
Since bank-client relationships take time to develop, large banks are likely to have 
persistently high market shares irrespective of past performance.  We therefore either 
include a bank fixed effect or the bank’s past market share as regressors.  Standard errors 
are clustered at the bank level.   
Strikingly, even though RET is a positive predictor of future performance, the first 
six columns of Table 7 show that it is an insignificant determinant of market share 
(consistent with Rau (2000)).  By contrast, even though market share negatively predicts 
performance, it is strongly significantly related to future share.  The last three columns of 
Table 7 repeat the analysis adding an interaction between RET and SHARE which is 
generally insignificant, suggesting that the results are similar across all sizes of banks.19  
This lack of performance chasing is a sufficient condition for ability to translate into 
persistence and thus underpins the results of Section 3.  The strong performance-chasing 
by mutual fund investors, and the absence of such behavior by acquirers, may thus 
reconcile the performance persistence in M&A with its absence in mutual funds.  Our 
results echo Kaplan and Schoar (2005), who document persistence in private equity 
performance (also found by Axelson et al. (2010)), and that top performing funds grow 
proportionally more slowly than poorly performing funds, which explains why 
persistence can arise.   
The significance of past market share, even though it negatively predicts future 
performance, and irrelevance of past returns, even though it is a positive predictor, may 
appear at first glance to be inefficient.  However, applying the Berk and Green (2004) 
framework to our setting, responsiveness to performance requires not only learning about 
ability from past returns but also competitive provision of M&A mandates by clients.  
Thus, lack of performance-chasing can occur if either assumption is violated, and 
                                                 
19 The coefficient on the interaction term in the 1-year analysis is significant at the 10% level, but the 
marginal effect of RET at a 5% market share is not significant. 
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therefore has different interpretations.  Mandate awards may be non-competitive if clients 
build up relationship-specific capital with a particular bank, which can be leveraged by 
continuing to use it for future deals.  Thus, while past market share is a predictor of 
future mandates, it may not be a determinant (i.e. actively be used by acquirers in their 
selection decisions) – instead, its significance arises as it proxies for the extent of existing 
relationships.  Table 8 investigates the relationship-specific capital hypothesis by 
studying repeat acquirers, who have conducted at least one acquisition in the prior five 
years while being public.  Using a previously-mandated advisor is associated with a 
lower CAR of 0.24 percentage points (t-statistic of 1.74).  If the advisor had generated a 
negative average CAR for that particular client in question, the CAR is 0.79 percentage 
points lower than using past advisors that generated positive CARs (t-statistic of 4.09).  
These findings are consistent with the RET persistence results of Section 3.  However, 
even if using a past advisor is correlated with poor future M&A performance, it is not 
inefficient if the bank provides many other non-M&A services.  For example, Yasuda 
(2005) and Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2006, 2009) find that clients select 
underwriters based on lending relationships or analyst coverage.  Even if banks are 
providing no other services, clients may be “locked in” to a past advisor since working on 
a previous deal gives the advisor an information monopoly: Ljungqvist et al. (2006, 
2009) find that past co- or lead underwriters are typically appointed as future lead 
underwriters.  Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) highlight another source of lock-in: clients’ 
wish to avoid sharing banks with product market rivals.   
Learning about ability from past returns will not occur if clients are unaware of 
the persistence of RET and mistakenly believe that market share is a good measure of 
quality.  Under this interpretation, market share is significant not because clients are 
locked in and it proxies for existing relationships, but because they actively select on it.  
Indeed, both the insignificance of RET and the significance of SHARE are fully consistent 
with real-life practices in the investment banking industry, where league tables on market 
share are widely publicized and used as a proxy for expertise.  Therefore, industry 
participants have grown to take it for granted that market share equates with quality; 
similarly, many academic studies such as Rau (2000), Kale, Kini and Ryan (2003) and 
Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) use market share as their measure of quality.  However, we 
show that it is actually negatively correlated with performance.  By contrast, measures of 
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returns are less publicized, which hinders clients’ ability to use returns as an additional 
metric to learn about quality even if they are not locked-in. 
Given the lack of performance-chasing and importance of prior relationships, it is 
logical for banks to accept even bad deals. Not only will the mandate boost fee income 
today, but it will also create new relationships and thus the ability to win future mandates.  
Even though accepting bad deals will depress RET, this does not reduce future mandates, 
either due to lock-in or failure to learn.  Indeed, if certain banks are systematically non-
selective and accept bad deals, this would lead to the negative correlation between market 
share and RET that we document.   
As a preliminary investigation into the importance of lock-in for M&A, we study 
the extent to which clients switch M&A advisors.  During 1985-2007, we find that on 
21.4% of M&A deals where the acquirer had made at least one acquisition in the past five 
years, the advisors also covered all of the acquirer’s M&A deals over the past five years.  
On 50.1% of deals, the advisors covered at least one deal over the past five years.  
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2005) find that 64.1% of equity issuers used the same 
underwriter for their IPO and first SEO.  Our figures are somewhat lower, tentatively 
suggesting that lock-in may be slightly weaker in M&A.  One potential explanation is 
that a significant amount of M&A advice is target-specific, and thus knowledge built up 
during one transaction may be less applicable for future deals.  Our findings are 
consistent with Francis, Hasan and Sun (2009), who find that fewer than 20% of deals are 
conducted by exclusive advisors, which they interpret as evidence that existing 
relationships are less influential for advisor choice in M&A than other banking services.  
Given the importance of other banking services, we also gather SDC issuance 
data to measure debt and equity underwriting relationships, and Dealscan data to measure 
lending relationships.20  Since Dealscan data is sparse until 1988, the lending numbers are 
calculated from 1993; for consistency, we use the same timeframe for the issuance data.  
We find that, on 9.5% of M&A deals over 1993-2007, the advisors also covered all of the 
acquirer’s issuance over the past five years; on 45.4% of deals, banks covered at least one 
issue.  For lending, the numbers drop to 6.7% and 15.8% respectively.  While we do not 
have a benchmark for a formal test, these relatively low numbers suggest that clients use 
different advisors for their M&A business than for their underwriting and borrowing 
                                                 
20 We thank Michael Roberts for providing us with the table to link Dealscan to Compustat, used in Chava 
and Roberts (2008). 
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decisions.  Indeed, while there are plausibly strong synergies between lending and bond 
underwriting (Yasuda (2005)), the connection between lending and M&A advice appears 
to be weaker.  We also attempt to study the selection decisions of clients who are not 
locked in and thus have freedom on advisor choice.  We take a subsample of clients that 
engaged in no M&A deals, issuance or borrowing with our 143 advisors in the past five 
years, and thus have no existing relationships.  We note that this is not a perfect measure 
of freedom.  First, it may include “un-free” clients: if some of these acquirers intend to 
engage in issuance or borrowing in the future, they may select an M&A advisor who 
provides these services.  Second, it may exclude “free” clients: some clients may have 
engaged in issuance or borrowing with an M&A advisor in the past, but have no intention 
of doing so in the foreseeable future.   If lock-in, rather than failure to learn, is the reason 
for the aggregate insignificance of RET for market share in Table 7, then RET should be 
positively correlated with future mandates for “free” acquirers.  By contrast, Table 9 
shows that RET is negatively correlated with future mandates in most specifications 
(though statistically insignificant) for this subsample.  This suggests that failure to learn 
is a cause of the insignificance of past performance.  However, we note that these results 
are only suggestive, due to the difficulty of identifying “free” clients mentioned earlier, 
and our small sample size: we can only identify “free” clients from 1993 onwards, and 
only 1,224 deals were conducted by such acquirers.   
If clients are indeed not fully locked-in, our results suggest that they may be able 
to improve their advisor selection decisions by using information on past returns to 
supplement market share information.21  An increased focus on returns may in turn 
dissuade banks from accepting value-destructive transactions.  The findings also have 
implications for the nature of contracts between acquirers and advisors.  McLaughlin 
(1990) finds that banks are paid for deal completion but not value creation.  He suggests 
that reputational concerns may be sufficient to align banks with clients, since a bank that 
performs poorly will not win future mandates.  However, the insignificance of RET 
implies that banks’ implicit incentives are also low – if clients are locked in or do not 
learn from RET, banks can be less concerned with returns – and so explicit incentives 
                                                 
21 Since shareholders are diversified, they are not concerned with idiosyncratic risk.  Thus, a value-
maximizing manager should maximize expected CAR rather than a measure adjusted for the variance.  
However, managers may care about the variance of CAR if they are concerned with their own undiversified 
human capital. We find that a bank’s RET is highly correlated with its “Sharpe ratio” of RET divided by the 
standard deviation of CAR.  Over three-year non-overlapping windows beginning in 1981, we find the 
average Spearman rank correlation of RET and the “Sharpe ratio” to be 0.965. 
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would be valuable.  In a similar vein, clients frequently solicit fairness opinions to verify 
that the terms are “fair” (Kisgen, Qian and Song (2009)).  As part of its mandate, an 
advisor should ensure that the client is undertaking only favorable deals in the first place, 
and there should be no need for a separate fairness opinion.  The prevalence of such 
opinions is consistent with the view that incentives to act in clients’ interests are 
insufficient, either due to lock-in or failure to learn. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper finds a significant investment bank fixed effect in the announcement 
returns to an acquisition.  The positive association between certain banks and high returns 
can be predicted by clients using past performance – a bank’s returns are persistent.  
While most prior research attributes the entire CAR to the advisor, we remove the 
component that can be explained by acquirer characteristics; the orthogonal component 
remains persistent.  These results suggest that certain banks have ability in identifying 
acquisitions or negotiating terms, or trustworthiness in turning down bad deals.  They 
contrast prior findings that bank quality, as measured by market share or reputation, has 
no positive effect on M&A outcomes, thus suggesting that banks do not matter.  The lack 
of performance-chasing by clients potentially explains why persistence exists in M&A 
advice even though it is absent in mutual fund performance.   
This paper suggests a number of questions for future research.  First, it may be 
interesting to study why clients do not chase performance and whether such behavior is 
efficient – i.e. disentangle whether it results from rational lock-in or inefficient failure to 
learn (e.g. due to an acquirer’s private benefits from working with a prestigious bank.)  
Agency variables such as governance may explain advisor choice, just as they do for 
acquirer returns (Masulis et al. (2007)).  Second, the low returns to ability appear 
puzzling.  While superior performance in equity underwriting is rewarded with higher 
future market share (Dunbar (2000), Hoberg (2007)), and superior returns to private 
equity investing increases future fund flows (Chung et al. (2010)), there seems to be little 
reward for good M&A advice.  Third, we have focused on acquirer returns since these are 
frequently negative, and so advisor selection is particularly important for bidders to 
ensure value creation; in addition, far more bidders are public than targets.  It would be 
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fruitful to investigate whether target returns also exhibit a bank fixed effect, and whether 
the banks that consistently create value for bidders are also skilled at defense mandates.   
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Plots of estimated bank fixed effects against number of deals announced in the full 
sample.  The fixed effects are estimated from regressions of the (-1,+1) CAR of deals on 
bank fixed effects and control variables.  Plot (1) includes time fixed effects as controls, 
(2) includes acquirer characteristics and time fixed effects, and (3) includes acquirer 
characteristics, acquirer fixed effects, and time fixed effects. 
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Table 1 
Definition of variables used in the analyses.  Where applicable, we include the Compustat 
item number in the description. 
 
Panel A: Used in the calculation of residuals for CAR 
Variable Definition 
RUNUP Log stock return for the acquirer from -210 to -11. 
Q Log of Tobin’s Q. 
Tobin’s Q = Market value of assets / Total assets (#6). 
Market value of common stock = Common shares outstanding 
(#25) * Price (#199). 
Market value of assets = Book value of assets (#6) + Market 
value of common stock – Book value of common stock (#60) – 
Balance sheet deferred taxes (#74). 
LEVERAGE LEVERAGE = Book debt / (Total assets (#6) – Book equity + 
Market equity). 
Book equity = Total assets (#6) – Total liabilities (#181) – 
Preferred stock (#10) + Deferred taxes (#35, if available) 
Substitute Redemption value of preferred stock (#56) if 
Preferred stock is missing. 
Book debt = Total assets (#6) – Book equity. 
Market equity = Common shares outstanding (#25) * Price 
(#199). 
FCF FCF = Free cash flow / Total assets (#6). 
Free cash flow = Operating income before depreciation (#13) – 
Interest expense (#15) – Income taxes (#16) + ∆ Deferred taxes 
and investment tax credit (#35 - #35 from previous year) – 
Preferred dividends (#19) – Common dividends (#21). 







salesfirm , where industries are defined by the 
Fama-French 49 industries. 
SELLEXP SELLEXP = median selling expenses (#189) over Sales (#12) 
for industry 
INST Fraction of outstanding common shares owned by institutions 
from Thomson Financial 13f filings. 
OPPERF Firm operating performance minus the industry median in the 
past year. 
Operating performance = Operating income before depreciation 
(#13) / 0.5(Total assets + last year’s total assets (#6)). 
INSIDER 
 
Insider ownership as a fraction of total shares outstanding, from 
Compact Disclosure. Where missing, we impute it using Sales 
(#12) and firm age (from CRSP). 
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ACQSIC Log of number of acquirer SIC codes. 
REPEAT 
ACQUIRER 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer announced an 
acquisition in the previous 5 years. 
  
Panel B: Constructed for direct use in quintile analysis and regressions 
Variable Definition 
RET Average CAR (3-day cumulative abnormal return) for deals 
advised by an investment bank over a given number of years. 
RETRES Average residual from a regression of CAR on acquirer 
characteristics defined in Panel A. 
SHARE Market share by value of acquirer-advised deals for an 




Regression of CAR on acquirer characteristics.  CAR is the return in excess of the CRSP 
value-weighted index over a (-1,+1) window relative to the announcement date.  The 
regressors are described in Table 1.  The sample period is 1980-2007 and t-statistics are 
in parentheses.   























REPEAT ACQUIRER -0.0028 
(1.89)* 
Year FE Yes 
Acquirer Industry FE Yes 
# obs 12,622 
R-sqd (%) 4.17 





Bank fixed effects to a deal’s CAR.  Panel A reports F-tests for the joint significance of 
bank fixed effects from a regression of (-1,+1) CAR on bank fixed effects and listed 
controls.  Acquirer characteristics are defined in Table 1.  Panel B reports the distribution 
of bank fixed effects, weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the fixed effects.  
Panel C reports analysis on fixed effects for banks that announced at least 84 deals over 
the full sample.  Panels D and E repeat these analyses filtering out acquirers with stock 
prices below $1 and missing trading volume either on the day after announcement or both 
2 and 3 days before announcement.  F-statistics, p-values, and numbers of constraints are 
listed.  The number of constraints equals the number of bank fixed effects estimated in 
the regression minus one.  In specification (3), the adjusted R-squared for this 
specification is after removing acquirers that undertake only one transaction, and then de-
meaning by acquirer before regressing on acquirer characteristics, time dummies and 
bank dummies.  The sample period is 1980-2007. 
 
Panel A: Investment Bank Fixed Effects 
  Controls  Bank FE F-test  Obs   Adj R-sqd (%) 
(1) Time FE  1.65 (0.0000, 142)  15,344 0.97 
(2) Acq chars, time FE  1.44 (0.0006, 141)  12,622 3.98 
(3) Acq chars, acq FE, time FE  1.47 (0.0003, 138)  10,430 3.27 
 
 
Panel B: Distribution of Bank Fixed Effects 
   Std Dev   25th   75th   Interquartile Range 
(1)  1.37% -0.91% 0.35% 1.26% 
(2)  1.39% -0.53% 0.41% 0.94% 
(3)  2.00% -0.65% 0.58% 1.23% 
 
Panel C: Fixed Effects for Active Banks 
  Bank FE F-test  Std Dev   25th   75th  
 Interquartile 
Range 
(1)  1.69 (0.0038, 41)  0.64% -0.85% 0.21% 1.06% 
(2)  1.41 (0.0431, 41)  0.66% -0.45% 0.28% 0.74% 
(3)  1.60 (0.0092, 41)  0.86% -0.47% 0.27% 0.74% 
 
 
 Panel D: Investment Bank Fixed Effects with Filters   
   Controls  
Bank FE F-test (all 
banks) 
Banks FE F-test 
(active banks) Obs 
 Adj R-
sqd (%) 
(1)  Time FE  1.60 (0.0000, 142) 1.68 (0.0043, 41) 14,955 0.98 
(2)  Acq chars, time FE  1.45 (0.0004, 141) 1.45 (0.0305, 41) 12,347 3.62 




Panel E: Distribution of Bank Fixed Effects with Filters  
  Banks  Std Dev   25th   75th  
 Interquartile 
Range 
(1) All 1.36% -0.88% 0.34% 1.22% 
(1) Active Banks 0.64% -0.80% 0.31% 1.11% 
(2) All 1.40% -0.74% 0.39% 1.12% 
(2) Active Banks 0.67% -0.45% 0.17% 0.61% 
(3) All 2.00% -0.73% 0.51% 1.23% 




Summary statistics for the top 15 investment banks by number of announced deals from 1980-2007.  The averages provided in the last row 
include deals for all investment banks in the sample.  RET is a bank’s average (-1,+1) CAR; RETRES is a bank’s average CARRES, the 
acquirer characteristic unexplained return (residuals from regressing CAR on acquirer characteristics).  The three final columns display bank 
fixed effects as estimated in Table 3. Specification (1) includes time fixed effects; specification (2) includes time fixed effects and acquirer 












Goldman Sachs 1,126 23.64% 0.07% 0.13% -0.93% 0.13% 0.17% 
Morgan Stanley 1,108 14.91% 0.09% 0.02% -0.91% -0.03% -0.31% 
Merrill Lynch 997 16.91% 0.18% -0.13% -0.85% -0.22% -0.47% 
CSFB 828 10.85% 0.38% -0.41% -0.60% -0.45% -0.70% 
SSB/Citigroup 821 16.74% 0.51% -0.00% -0.38% -0.08% 0.24% 
Lehman 803 8.08% 0.58% 0.15% -0.35% 0.07% 0.09% 
JP Morgan Chase 500 8.22% 0.28% 0.02% -0.48% 0.02% 0.27% 
Lazard 427 7.74% 0.46% 0.27% -0.47% 0.28% -0.24% 
DLJ 407 3.02% 0.68% -0.64% -0.45% -0.75% -1.12% 
Bear Stearns 374 4.43% 0.98% 0.23% -0.04% 0.14% 0.05% 
UBS Warburg 367 7.32% -0.12% -0.45% -0.98% -0.45% -0.41% 
Bank of America 299 4.21% 1.47% 0.67% 0.64% 0.65% 0.58% 
Salomon (pre-merger) 284 1.98% 0.66% -0.23% -0.56% -0.33% -0.62% 
JP Morgan (pre-merger) 267 3.41% 0.62% 0.43% -0.46% 0.41% 0.21% 
Deutsche Bank 244 4.34% 1.04% 0.82% 0.26% 0.88% 0.08% 
Avg over entire sample 15,344 0.72% 0.00% 
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Table 5 
Persistence in a bank’s average returns and source of low returns.  Panel A sorts banks 
into quintiles based on their RET (average (-1,+1) CAR) over the past j calendar years, 
where j = {1,2,3}.  To be included in the analysis, a bank must have announced at least 2j 
deals over the relevant period.  Q1 represents the banks with the lowest past RET, Q5 the 
highest.  For each quintile, we then calculate the average CAR to future acquisitions 
announced by the banks in that quintile over the next k calendar years, where k = {1,2,3}.  
Panel B and repeats the analysis for RETRES (average of CARRES, the acquirer 
characteristic unexplained return).  Panel C examines RET and RETRES calculated using 
transaction-value weighted measures.  Panel D studies the correlation between RET and 
the contemporaneous percentage of positive CAR deals.  Panels E subdivides the sample 
into the top 2/3 of banks by number of deals in each sorting period (Large Advisors) and 
the bottom 1/3 (Small Advisors).  Banks are sorted each period into terciles and halves, 
respectively.  The sample period is 1981-2007.  Newey-West t-statistics are in 
parentheses.   
 
Panel A: Persistence in Raw Returns 
 Future RET Measured Over 
Quintiles Measured Over   1yr   2yrs   3yrs 
1yr RET 
Q1  0.92% 0.66% 0.69% 
Q5  1.49% 1.48% 1.44% 
Q5 - Q1  0.57% 0.82% 0.76% 
  (1.32) (2.73)*** (2.85)*** 
2yrs RET 
Q1  0.52% 0.61% 0.74% 
Q5  1.47% 1.55% 1.36% 
Q5 - Q1  0.95% 0.94% 0.63% 
  (2.58)** (3.07)*** (1.99)** 
3yrs RET 
Q1  0.59% 0.57% 0.60% 
Q5  1.68% 1.73% 1.54% 
Q5 - Q1  1.09% 1.16% 0.94% 
  (2.74)*** (3.55)*** (2.91)*** 
 
Panel B: Persistence in Residual Returns 
 Future RETRES Measured Over 
Quintiles Measured Over   1yr   2yrs   3yrs 
1yr RETRES 
Q5 - Q1  0.78% 0.80% 0.85% 
(1.71)* (2.51)** (3.32)*** 
2yrs RETRES 
Q5 - Q1  1.35% 0.92% 0.55% 
(2.86)*** (2.85)*** (1.88)* 
3yrs RETRES 
Q5 - Q1  0.75% 0.55% 0.37% 
  (1.76)* (1.82)* (1.29) 
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Panel C: Persistence in Returns (Transaction value-weighted measures) 
Quintiles  Future RET Measured Over Quintiles  Future RETRES Measured Over 
Measured Over   1yr   2yrs   3yrs Measured Over   1yr   2yrs   3yrs 
1yr RET 1yr RETRES 
Q5 - Q1  0.62% 1.01% 1.00% Q5 - Q1  0.95% 1.31% 0.82% 
  (1.07) (2.01)** (2.22)**   (1.63) (2.93)*** (1.95)* 
2yrs RET 2yrs RETRES 
Q5 - Q1  0.98% 0.98% 0.81% Q5 - Q1  0.38% 0.65% 0.23% 
  (1.79)* (1.88)* (1.52)   (0.69) (1.26) (0.43) 
3yrs RET 3yrs RETRES 
Q5 - Q1  0.45% 1.36% 1.07% Q5 - Q1  0.62% 0.75% 0.50% 
  (0.84) (2.47)** (2.01)**   (1.08) (1.27) (0.80) 
Panel D: Percentage of Positive CAR deals, by RET Quintile 
 RET Measured Over 
 1yr   2yrs   3yrs 
Q1  26.51% 34.90% 37.56% 
Q5  71.64% 67.41% 64.67% 
Q5 - Q1  45.13% 32.51% 27.11% 
  (25.12)*** (22.07)*** (19.26)*** 
 
Panel E: Persistence by Size of Advisor 
Large Advisors Small Advisors 
Terciles Future RET Measured Over Halves Future RET Measured Over 
Measured Over 1yr 2yrs 3yrs Measured Over 1yr 2yrs 3yrs 
1yr RET 1yr RET 
T3 - T1 0.40% 0.48% 0.41% H2 - H1 1.07% 0.80% 1.24% 
  (1.50) (2.53)** (2.29)**   (1.62) (1.62) (2.79)*** 
2yrs RET 2yrs RET 
T3 - T1 0.45% 0.43% 0.33% H2 - H1 1.69% 1.04% 0.96% 
  (1.82)* (2.23)** (1.58)   (3.12)*** (2.50)** (2.48)** 
3yrs RET 3yrs RET 
T3 - T1 0.48% 0.41% 0.37% H2 - H1 1.17% 1.16% 1.02% 
  (1.77)* (1.97)** (1.73)*   (2.26)** (2.56)** (2.46)** 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6 
Determinants of RET.  The dependent variable is RET, a bank’s average (-1,+1) CAR across all deals announced by the bank over a single 
calendar year.  The explanatory variable RET is the average CAR over the past j calendar years, where j = {1,2,3}.  SHARE is the bank’s 
market share, by value of deals, over the past j calendar years.  To be included in the regression, a bank must have announced at least 2j 
deals over the relevant period.  In Panel B, an interaction term between RET and SHARE is included.  The marginal effect of RET at a 
SHARE of 5% is also included.  In Panel C, FIRSTHALF equals 1 if the dependent variable is in 1994 or earlier and 0 otherwise.  The data is 
pooled across all banks and regressions are estimated using year fixed effects, clustering standard errors by bank.  The sample period is 
1981-2007 and t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
  Panel A: Determinants of Bank-Level RET 
  1yr 1yr 2yrs 2yrs 3yrs 3yrs 
Past j years 
RET 0.0958 0.0908 0.1974 0.1876 0.1789 0.1619 
(2.22)** (2.09)** (3.38)*** (3.21)*** (2.82)*** (2.56)** 
SHARE -0.0346 -0.0351 -0.0416 
(3.17)*** (3.00)*** (3.59)*** 
# obs 993 993 947 947 897 897 
R-sqd (%) 6.16 6.51 6.22 6.56 5.06 5.56 
 
  Panel B: Determinants of Bank-Level RET with RET-SHARE Interaction 
   1yr   1yr   2yrs   2yrs   3yrs   3yrs 
Past j years 
RET  0.0968 0.0919 0.2044 0.1920 0.1786 0.1566 
(2.03)** (1.93)* (3.25)*** (3.05)*** (2.66)*** (2.33)** 
SHARE  -0.0346 -0.0347 -0.0421 
(3.16)*** (2.95)*** (3.66)*** 
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RET X -0.0893 -0.0945 -0.6364 -0.3889 0.0280 0.4964 
SHARE (0.11) (0.11) (0.46) (0.27) (0.02) (0.35) 
# obs  993 993 947 947 897 897 
R-sqd (%)  6.16 6.52 6.24 6.57 5.06 5.57 
RET (at  0.0924 0.0871 0.1726 0.1725 0.1800 0.1814 
5% SHARE) (2.12)** (1.92)* (2.40)** (2.34)** (2.31)** (2.30)** 
 
  Panel C: Determinants of Bank-Level RET with First-Half Interaction 
  1yr 1yr 2yrs 2yrs 3yrs 3yrs 
Past j years 
RET X 0.0406 0.0290 0.0998 0.0806 0.1222 0.0921 
FIRST HALF (0.43) (0.31) (0.81) (0.64) (0.88) (0.64) 
RET 0.0826 0.0805 0.1666 0.1618 0.1404 0.1310 
(1.49) (1.46) (2.19)** (2.14)** (1.87)* (1.76)* 
SHARE X -0.0256 -0.0219 -0.0326 
FIRST HALF (1.05) (0.77) (1.16) 
SHARE -0.0244 -0.0265 -0.0304 
(2.01)** (2.36)** (2.58)** 
# obs 993 993 947 947 897 897 
R-sqd (%) 6.19 6.58 6.33 6.67 5.19 5.72 




Determinants of market share.  The dependent variable is a bank’s market share, by value of deals, in one particular year.  RET is the bank’s 
average (-1,+1) CAR over the past j calendar years, where j = {1,2,3}.  SHARE is the bank’s market share, by value of deals, over the past j 
calendar years.  The data is pooled across all banks and regressions are estimated using bank fixed effects and clustering standard errors at 
the bank level.  To be included in the results, a bank must have announced at least 2j deals over the period used to estimate RET and 
SHARE.  The sample period is 1981-2007 and t-statistics are in parentheses.   
 
  1yr 2yrs 3yrs 1yr 2yr 3yrs  1yr   2yrs   3yrs  
Constant 0.0099 0.0068 0.0059 0.0098 0.0068 0.0059 
(4.55)*** (4.08)*** (4.64)*** (4.59)*** (4.07)*** (4.65)*** 
RET 0.0007 -0.0259 -0.0499 -0.0025 -0.0370 -0.0357 -0.0313 -0.0486 -0.0518 
(0.03) (0.46) (0.63) (0.14) (1.14) (1.09) (1.49) (1.74)* (1.52) 
SHARE 0.6805 0.8118 0.8489 0.6830 0.8114 0.8480 
(13.09)*** (17.67)*** (28.08)*** (13.26)*** (17.70)*** (28.82)*** 
RET X  3.1504 1.0993 1.5095 
SHARE  (1.80)* (0.30) (0.42) 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
# obs 1,168 1,079 1,017 1,168 1,079 1,017 1,168 1,079 1,017 
R-sqd (%) 59.72 60.69 61.14 44.53 54.83 58.23 44.81 54.85 58.24 
RET (at 0.1262 0.0063 0.0237 
5% SHARE) (1.60) (0.04) (0.15) 






Relationship between a deal’s (-1,+1) CAR and the use of a past advisor.  Deals in which 
the acquirer has made an acquisition in the last five years while public are considered.  
Panel A divides deals into groups according to whether the acquirer retained an advisor 
from a past transaction.  Panel B examines the differences in average CAR between 
groups.  The sample period is 1985-2007 and t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
Panel A 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Did not retain 











CAR 0.33% 0.09% 0.46% -0.33% 
t-statistic (3.28)*** (0.89) (3.37)*** (2.41)** 
# obs 3,793 4,291 2,263 2,028 
Panel B 
(1) - (2) (1) - (3) (1) - (4) (3) - (4) 
CAR 0.24% -0.13% 0.66% 0.79% 
t-statistic (1.74)* (0.78) (3.89)*** (4.09)*** 
   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9 
Logit regressions of advisor choice by acquirers without a previous M&A, issuance or 
lending relationship over the last 5 years with one of our 143 banks.  The analysis is at 
the acquirer-bank level and the dependent variable equals 1 if the acquirer mandated that 
particular bank.  Banks that do not advise on M&A in the year of the deal are treated as 
unavailable and excluded from the analysis.  RET is the bank’s average (-1,+1) CAR over 
the past j calendar years.  SHARE is the bank’s market share by value of deals over the 
past j calendar years.  Standard errors are clustered by deal.  The sample period is 1993-
2007 and t-statistics are in parentheses. 
  1yr 1yr 2yrs 2yrs 3yrs 3yrs 
Past j years 
Constant -4.4597 -4.5908 -4.4199 -4.5797 -4.4063 -4.5746 
(168.92)*** (144.50)***(154.13)***(125.75)*** (141.84)*** (114.91)***
RET -0.3508 0.0059 -2.2120 -1.3952 -2.5828 -1.1367 
(0.37) (0.01) (1.56) (0.90) (1.47) (0.59) 
SHARE 4.0123 4.5560 4.5307 
(8.26)*** (8.40)*** (8.07)*** 
# obs 67,806 67,806 63,586 63,586 60,791 60,791 
Pseudo R-sqd (%) 0.00 0.56 0.02 0.68 0.02 0.66 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
